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I.

INTRODUCTION

Disorderly conduct is a criminal charge that prohibits
a broad range of behavior. One state statute, for example,
criminalizes “violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous,
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct,” even
when such conduct merely “tends to cause or provoke a
disturbance” without actually doing so.2
There are many valid criticisms of disorderly conduct
laws, including that they are too broad in scope, 3 carry
penalties that are too harsh,4 and fail to give sufficient notice
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of what specific acts are actually criminalized. 5 A fourth
criticism of such statutes is race-based. At least two law
professors have recently called for the abolition of disorderly
conduct statutes, in part because the police are allegedly
using such laws to surveil African American “communities
for signs of disorder” and “as a means of social control against
people of color.”6
This article investigates this race-based claim, which
I call the race-motivated theory of disorderly conduct.7 To do
so, I selected a sample of 91 disorderly conduct cases from a
timeframe, venue, and jurisdiction that would likely
substantiate the race-motivated theory, if the theory is true.8
I then tested two hypotheses: (1) I hypothesize that the
evidence will not support the race-motivated theory of
disorderly conduct; and (2) I further hypothesize that the
disorderly conduct statute is being abused, not by police, but
by prosecutors (and in a race-neutral way).9
The investigation confirmed the first hypothesis.
Although African Americans were indeed charged
disproportionately (25.3% of all cases) relative to their
population (11.5%), 10 the investigation was able to
completely rule out police surveillance as the cause. 11
Instead, in every single case filed against an African
American defendant, the police were summoned to the
scene—usually by a witness who knew the defendant well, if
not intimately—for accusations of criminal activity.12
The investigation of this first hypothesis has its
limitations. Most significantly, it examines data from only
one state, one county, and three law enforcement agencies.13
But that is also the primary lesson imparted by this article.
Broad, sweeping claims of systemic police racism are popular
in academia, but the reality is that policing is a very state-,
county-, and even agency-specific matter. 14 Such far-

See Part II.C.
See Part II.D.
7 See Part III.
8 See Part III.B.
9 See Part III.A.
10 See Part III.C.
11 See Part IV.A.
12 See id.
13 See Part V.
14 See id.
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reaching claims of racism are therefore often misplaced and
detract from the true, underlying problem.15
The investigation also confirmed the second
hypothesis. Regardless of the defendant’s race, 75 of the 91
disorderly conduct cases (82.4%) also included a charge or
charges other than disorderly conduct.16 Most commonly, 23
of the cases (25.3%) were two-count cases charging an
underlying battery crime with a disorderly conduct tackedon for the same incident. 17 This prosecutorial practice of
charge-stacking gives the state tremendous leverage over the
defendant in plea bargaining, thus enabling it to obtain a
conviction without the risk or inconvenience of a jury trial.18
Concerning this second finding, i.e., that disorderly
conduct is being abused not by police but by prosecutors (and
in a race-neutral way), this article argues for specific and
simple statutory reform to protect defendants of all races
from prosecutorial misuse, and overuse, of the disorderly
conduct law.19

II. THE CRIME OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT
Misdemeanor crimes have received a substantial
amount of attention in law journals in recent years.20 Even
one of the lowliest misdemeanors, disorderly conduct, is
about to see its time in the spotlight.21 Disorderly conduct is
See id.
See Part III.C.
17 See Part IV.B.
18 See id. In fact, not a single case in the sample went to jury trial.
However, as discussed in Part IV.B., this does not necessarily prove a
cause-and-effect relationship between charge-stacking and the zeropercent trial rate for cases in the sample.
19 See Part VI.
20 See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors By
the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971, 974 (2020) (“After decades of neglect,
misdemeanors have entered mainstream criminal-justice debates.”);
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012)
(“Most U.S. convictions are misdemeanors, and they are generated in
ways that baldly contradict the standard due process model of criminal
adjudication.”); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2013) (“There is a misdemeanor crisis
in the United States.”).
21 See, e.g., Rachel Moran, Doing Away with Disorderly Conduct, 63 B.C.
L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 2022), at
15
16
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a strange criminal charge. Unlike other misdemeanors—
such as battery, prostitution, theft, or driving under the
influence—disorderly conduct is difficult, if not impossible,
to define. As a result, criminal statutes vary greatly from
state to state.22
For example, California’s near book-length disorderly
conduct statute dedicates several paragraphs to
criminalizing “any act of prostitution,” and then itemizes
several prohibited uses of “a concealed camcorder, motion
picture camera, or photographic camera.” 23 Texas’s mere
article-length statute, by comparison, criminalizes the
creation of “a noxious and unreasonable odor” before it
switches gears to delineate several illegal uses of firearms.24
The statute then takes a truly unexpected turn: it rather
oddly and specifically outlaws the “reckless” exposure of
one’s “anus or genitals in public.”25
On the other hand, relative to California and Texas,
Florida’s disorderly conduct statute is short and sweet.
Weighing in at a mere 74 words, it prohibits “such acts” that
“affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness
them.”26 More impressive still, Wisconsin’s statute is short
on language yet amazingly broad in scope. In only 40 words,
it criminalizes conduct that merely tends to cause a
disturbance, even when no actual disturbance results.27 In
its entirety, it reads: “Whoever, in a public or private place,
engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous,
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under
circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke
a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.”28
While the above statutes may seem relatively
harmless, in many respects they are quite serious and can
wreak havoc with defendants’ lives in a variety of ways.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3807607; Jamelia N.
Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. __
(forthcoming, 2021), at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552620.
22 See Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 4-8 (citing all fifty states’
disorderly conduct statutes).
23 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647.
24 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01.
25 Id.
26 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.03.
27 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.01.
28 Id.
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Because of this, many authors have harshly criticized
disorderly conduct statutes, and two forthcoming law review
articles call for their abolition.29

III. ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLITION
While there are many criticisms of disorderly conduct
statutes, four arguments for their abolition center on the
statutes’ reach, associated penalties, lack of notice, and
racially disparate impact.

A. WE’RE ALL CRIMINALS NOW
One argument for abolishing the disorderly conduct
statute is that its language is so broad that it criminalizes
too much behavior and, in a related vein, those in power have
too much discretion to unfairly target the unpopular among
us.30
For example, in a case involving the Wisconsin
statute discussed in Part I, a defense lawyer went to visit his
client who was being held at a state mental health facility.31
The client had retained the lawyer “to try to effect her release
from that institution.” 32 Upon arrival during regular
business hours, the lawyer was denied access to his client for
no legitimate reason. 33 One of the nurses even said, “he
really did not know exactly why everyone wanted the [lawyer]
to leave the ward.”34

See Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 41 (“While this article is the first
to call for abolition of disorderly conduct laws, other scholars have
expressed concern about these laws for decades.”). This claim about
being the first to advocate for abolishing the statutes may be true;
however, it may also demonstrate the narcissism of petty differences, as
at least one other author has nearly simultaneously “propose[d]
legalizing disorderly conduct.” Jamelia Morgan, supra note 21, at 54
(emphasis added).
30 See Rachel Moran, supra note 20, at 21-22.
31 State v. Elson, 208 N.W.2d 363 (Wis. 1973).
32 Id. at 367.
33 Id. at 368 (“On the visit involved here, the hospital aide in charge of
signing in visitors, Eleanor Lynch, told the defendant that he could not
be allowed to visit and that the hospital administration had a new rule
which forbade his presence on the ward, she thought, because his
presence had been agitating to the patients in the past.”).
34 Id.
29
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The lawyer objected to being singled out this way, and
he “insisted he had the right to remain and visit with his
client.”35 When his protest fell on deaf ears, he “peaceably
left the premises.”36 But it was too late; merely poking the
bear got the lawyer in trouble. The prosecutor charged him,
under the disorderly conduct statute, for “otherwise
disorderly conduct” that “tends to cause” a disturbance. 37
The defense-lawyer-turned-defendant was convicted and
then appealed.38
The state’s high court upheld the conviction, but the
dissent criticized the incredible reach of the statute: the
phrase “otherwise disorderly conduct” is “vague and subject
to almost any interpretation that a complainant or a court
wishes to put upon it.” 39 This, in turn, permitted the
powerful to target the unpopular:
It appears . . . that the issuance of a complaint
and warrant after the [lawyer-]defendant
peaceably left the premises raises grave
questions of abuse of the criminal processes. . . .
The record shows that he alone was singled
out, by a patently illegal rule that denied
certain rights of access to patients. It would
appear . . . that this prosecution was instituted
not because of what [the lawyer-defendant]
had done, but because of who he was—a lawyer
who considered it his duty to protect his clients
in the face of official arrogance, a thorn in the
side of the hospital authorities. The record
shows pique not at what [the lawyerdefendant] did . . . but at his course of conduct
that had irritated the authorities to the extent
that they denominated him, as the complaint
reveals, an “undesirable person.”40

Id.
Id. at 372 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 368. There was no actual disturbance; rather, the disturbance
was merely possible or hypothetical or imaginary.
38 Id. at 363.
39 Id. at 372 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
40 Id. (emphasis added).
35
36
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This demonstrates that, with disorderly conduct statutes,
legislatures have given prosecutors a metaphorical blank
check to fill in as they see fit against even the mildest of
gadflies. If a lawyer demanding to see a client at a state
institution during normal business hours is disorderly, then
we’re all criminals now.

B. DOES THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME?
Another argument for the abolition of disorderly
conduct is that the punishment is too severe for the relatively
minor, underlying disorderly act that gives rise to the
charge. 41 This is true in many cases, and the
disproportionate punishment is sometimes enabled by the
amazing breadth of the statute as discussed in Part II.A.
For example, the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute
carries a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail.42 However, if
the defendant has been convicted of three misdemeanors or
one felony in the five years preceding the alleged commission
of the disorderly conduct, then the maximum penalty jumps
to two years in prison.43 Worse yet, if the defendant has been
convicted of two domestic abuse misdemeanors (even if they
are both based upon a single incident or even a single act) in
the previous ten years,44 then any new domestic disorderly
conduct charge is transformed into a felony with a maximum
penalty of two years and three months in prison.45 And this

See Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 1 (“[T]hese laws create adverse
consequences disproportionate to the minor misbehaviors they
condemn.”).
42 WIS. STAT. § 939.51 (3) (b).
43 WIS. STAT. § 939.62.
44 WIS. STAT. § 939.621 (1) (b). Despite the statute’s requirement that the
defendant be “convicted on 2 or more separate occasions of a felony or a
misdemeanor” crime of domestic abuse in order to be a domestic abuse
repeater, the courts simply disregard the language “on 2 or more
separate occasions” and “interpret” that to mean “2 or more convictions”
regardless of whether they are based on separate occasions, the same
occasion, or even the same act. See Michael D. Cicchini, Criminal
Repeater Statutes: Occasions, Convictions, and Absurd Results, 11 HOUS.
L. REV. OFF REC. 1 (2020), at https://houstonlawreview.org/article/17127criminal-repeater-statutes-occasions-convictions-and-absurd-results.
45 WIS. STAT. § 939.621 (2).
41
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says nothing of the collateral consequences of a disorderly
conviction, which are many.46
Judges are not shy about using this available
incarceration time under the disorderly conduct statute,
particularly when they do not like the favorable concessions
the defense obtained in a plea bargain or the result the
defense achieved at a jury trial. For example, I once
defended a case with two serious, violent charges and a
disorderly conduct tack-on charge—a classic example of
prosecutorial charge-stacking.47 The case went to trial and
the jury acquitted on the two serious charges of violence but
convicted on the disorderly conduct charge—a huge trial
victory by any imaginable standard.
However, given that the language of the disorderly
conduct statute encompasses nearly every type of behavior,
it is never clear on what, exactly, the jury’s conviction for
that charge is based. And because the judge did not like the
jury’s verdict, he invoked at sentencing the statute’s
language prohibiting “violent or abusive” conduct. He
ignored the statute’s other, milder prohibitions (e.g.,
profanity) which were much more likely to have been the
true basis for the jury’s verdict given its acquittal on the two
serious, violent charges. The judge then sent the defendant
to prison (not jail) for disorderly conduct despite our trial
victory. Such judicial abuse of the statute certainly makes a
strong case for abolition.

This is especially true if the crime of conviction, possibly including
even a disorderly conduct, is classified as “violent.” See Michael O’Hear,
Third-Class Citizenship: The Escalating Legal Consequences of
Committing a “Violent” Crime, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (2019).
47 Ethics rules arguably—or at least under the incredibly expansive
interpretation of Wisconsin’s state bar and office of lawyer regulation—
prohibit my disclosure of the client’s name, even though the case is closed
and the information is publicly available. See Michael D. Cicchini, On the
Absurdity of Model Rule 1.9, 40 VT. L. REV. 69 (2015). I unsuccessfully
petitioned the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to change or clarify this
ethics rule—a rule which other states have already declared is a
violation of lawyer free speech rights. See Michael D. Cicchini, Petition to
Modify Wisconsin SCR 20:1.9, THE LEGAL WATCHDOG (Sept. 9, 2015), at
http://thelegalwatchdog.blogspot.com/2015/09/petition-to-modifywisconsin-scr-2019.html.
46
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C. WHAT IS DISORDERLY?
A serious problem with many disorderly conduct
statutes is that they fail to describe what conduct is criminal,
thus leaving a person to wonder whether his or her
contemplated act is prohibited.48 Parts II.A. and II.B. have
already indirectly discussed this problem. For consistency,
then, consider once again Wisconsin’s broad disorderly
conduct statute. Unlike statutes prohibiting such crimes as
battery, theft, drunk driving, or prostitution, for example,
could a reasonably intelligent reader discern what types of
conduct are prohibited by the disorderly conduct law?
To illustrate this conundrum, think back to the case,
discussed in Part II.A., involving the hapless lawyer. Then
try to imagine how shocked the lawyer-turned-defendant
must have been to learn that merely going to visit a client,
at a state facility during normal business hours, constituted
criminal disorderly conduct. No reasonable person or even
any lawyer—other than an imaginative, overeager
prosecutor—would have read the statute that way.
Worse yet, it is easy to envision constitutionally
protected speech being prosecuted under the disorderly
conduct statute.49 On college campuses, for example, one can
imagine a variety of political views—expressed with or
without the mildly “profane” language included in, but not
required by, the statute—that would plunge the student
body into a state of emotional disturbance.50 This, in turn,

See Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 12-15 (“A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if the average civilian cannot understand what
conduct the statute prohibits.”) (citing Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971)).
49 See id. at 12 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972)
(setting limits on laws that infringe upon speech)).
50 Many students are unable even to hear, let alone debate, opposing
views on certain subjects. See, e.g., Christian Schneider, Nearly TwoThirds of College Students Think Government Should Have Power to
Punish “Hate Speech”: Survey, COLLEGE FIX (Jan. 8, 2021) (In a survey,
“40 percent of students agreed the government should be able to restrict
the speech of ‘climate change deniers’ and 50 percent of students believe
the government should be able to restrict the speech of ‘racially
insensitive people.’”), at https://www.thecollegefix.com/nearly-two-thirdsof-college-students-think-government-should-have-power-to-punish-hatespeech-survey/.
48
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could satisfy the elements of the disorderly conduct statute
and could result in a conviction, or at least a prosecution,
depending on the political leanings of the jury and the
prosecutor. Stranger things have happened at the hands of
the intolerant.51
Granted, in speech cases, courts will often “interpret”
the statute more restrictively than its actual language reads,
thus protecting that particular defendant but also bailing out
the legislature and salvaging its facially unconstitutional
statute.52 But most citizens don’t realize that courts engage
in that type of linguistic dance; further, even if they did
realize it, most people would not want to wade into the legal
system, spend many thousands of dollars, and risk possible
conviction on the hope that a judge might temporarily
rewrite the statute in their favor.
Instead, most people intuitively know it is desirable
to avoid the court system. As the legal critic Ambrose Bierce
wrote about a woman who filed an injury lawsuit after falling
into an open sewer: “It is surprising that the lady should
have consented to go into Court; we should suppose that one
adventure in a cesspool would suffice.” 53 That is, no
reasonable person should willingly subject him- or herself to

Further, some universities have created trigger warnings and
bias reporting systems which make students hypersensitive and
emotionally fragile. This is a great disservice to the future lawyers
among them. Given the downright hostile environment that awaits
future criminal defense lawyers, and probably future litigators in
general, law schools should do their best to reverse this trend as part of
their professional training. See Michael D. Cicchini, Law Schools,
Lawyers, and Dead Philosophers, WIS. L.J. (Dec. 14, 2016) (arguing that
law schools should teach students the Stoic Method alongside the
Socratic Method), at https://wislawjournal.com/2016/12/14/critics-cornerlaw-schools-lawyers-and-dead-philosophers/; Michael D. Cicchini,
Combating Judicial Misconduct: A Stoic Approach, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1259
(2019) (providing Stoic strategies for dealing with abusive judges in the
courtroom).
51 See Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 21-22 (discussing disorderly
conduct prosecutions and convictions for unpopular speech, such as
“distributing religious literature”).
52 See id. at 15-16.
53 J. Gordon Hylton, The Devil’s Disciple and the Learned Profession:
Ambrose Bierce and the Practice of Law in Gilded Age America, 23 CONN.
L. REV. 705 (1991) (quoting Ambrose Bierce).
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litigation, which Bierce described as “[a] machine which you
go into as a pig and come out of as a sausage.”54
The problem, then, is that the disorderly conduct
statute violates our constitutional rights by “chilling a
substantial amount of protected speech” out of fear of
becoming criminal defendants. 55 This chilling effect is a
problem that, by its very nature, the courts will not witness
firsthand. Nonetheless, the courts have enabled it. How?
By bending over backward to preserve a legislature’s overly
broad disorderly conduct statute instead of striking it down
and bringing it the swift death it probably deserves.56

D. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The final criticism, and the one on which this article
will focus, relates to race. I will call it the race-motivated
theory of disorderly conduct. The professors who call for the
abolition of the disorderly conduct statutes on this theory
essentially make the following argument.
First, the police have “tremendous discretion . . . to
decide what laws to enforce and against whom.”57 And the
“disorderly conduct” law “equip[s] police with nearly
unfettered discretion to harass and arrest people engaged in
relatively harmless conduct[.]” 58 More specifically, the
professors claim that the police use the disorderly conduct
statute proactively to “surveil communities for signs of
disorder.”59
Second, the professors argue that, when it comes to
identifying disorder, “the mere status of being Black is often
perceived as a symbol of disorder[.]” 60 And because police
“perceptions of disorder are racialized,” they use the statute
Id. (quoting THE COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE: THE DEVIL’S
DICTIONARY 187 (1911)).
55 Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 12-13.
56 Id. at 15-16.
57 Id. at 18. This is usually true; however, as explained later in Part
IV.A., it actually is not true for most disorderly conduct cases in many
states due to mandatory domestic abuse arrest laws.
58 Id. at 33.
59 Id. at 31 (quoting Devon Carbado, Blue on Black Violence: A
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1486
(2016)).
60 Id. at 23 (citing Etienne Toussaint, Blackness As Fighting Words, 106
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 124 (2020)).
54
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to surveil or target African American neighborhoods.61 This
racist tactic then leads to a disproportionately high number
of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of African
Americans relative to their percentage of the population.62
In sum, racist police surveillance essentially turns the
disorderly conduct statute into a tool for “social control
against people of color.”63
I am no fan of the police; in fact, I have spent my legal
career battling them in court and criticizing them in writing.
For the last two decades, I have defended individuals
accused of crimes in which the police were almost always
adversarial, and sometimes even the complaining,
witnesses. 64 I have also spent the last fifteen or so years
writing books 65 and law review articles 66 to expose police
Id.
Id. at 32 (citing statistics that African Americans “comprised
approximately 32 percent of the people arrested for disorderly conduct,
despite representing less than 13 percent of the population.”). Then, the
resulting “convictions . . . adversely affect [the defendants’] ability to
obtain or maintain housing, jobs, and legal status in the country.” Id. at
2.
63 Id. at 23. As indicated earlier, there are at least two forthcoming
articles making claims of racist policing via disorderly conduct laws. See
also Jamelia Morgan, supra note 21, at 21 (“Negatively racialized groups,
trans and queer communities of color, low-to-no income communities of
color have in particular faced the harms of overpolicing due to
stereotypes that inform social perceptions of criminality and disorder.”).
64 See CICCHINI LAW OFFICE LLC: EXPERIENCE (accessed Apr. 26, 2021), at
https://cicchinilaw.com/experience.
65 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. CICCHINI, ANATOMY OF A FALSE CONFESSION: THE
INTERROGATION AND CONVICTION OF BRENDAN DASSEY (Rowman &
Littlefield 2018) (exposing multiple police interrogation tactics and
calling for legal reform to prevent such abuses); MICHAEL D. CICCHINI,
TRIED AND CONVICTED: HOW POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES DESTROY
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Rowman & Littlefield 2012) (exposing
police tactics in multiple contexts and calling for legal reform).
66 See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence, 75 MO. L. REV. 459 (2010) (arguing for
legal reform to deter police abuses of the Fourth Amendment); Michael
D. Cicchini & Joseph Easton, Reforming the Law on Show-Up
Identifications, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2010) (arguing for
legal reform to protect against police abuses in the eyewitness
identification process); Michael D. Cicchini, The New Miranda Warning,
65 SMU L. REV. 911 (arguing for legal reform to protect against police
abuses of the Miranda process); Anthony Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini
& Lawrence T. White, Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the
Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2021)
61
62
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misconduct and argue for legal reform that would end many
of their dishonest and unconstitutional practices.
Despite my strong anti-police bias, however, the claim
that the police are actively surveilling African Americans
“for signs of disorder,” so that prosecutors can convict them
of disorderly conduct, runs contrary to my experience with
how the government uses the statute. And although my
experience is necessarily limited to where I practice law, the
race-motivated theory of disorderly conduct strikes me as a
generally implausible one—at least in contemporary times.
Therefore, the next Part investigates this race-motivated
theory, and it also offers and investigates a second
hypothesis for how our government agents may be using the
disorderly conduct statute.

IV. THE INVESTIGATION
A. HYPOTHESES
I hypothesize that the race-motivated theory of
disorderly conduct will not be supported by the evidence.
More specifically, concerning criminal disorderly conduct, I
hypothesize that such charges are not the result of the police
surveilling African Americans for signs of disorder.
I further hypothesize that, concerning criminal
disorderly conduct, the statute is not being improperly used
by police, but rather by prosecutors. That is, I hypothesize
that prosecutors use disorderly conduct to stack charges
against defendants of all races to increase the number of
counts and potential penalties, thus coercing defendants to

accept plea bargains instead of going to trial.67
(analyzing recorded interrogations to expose police abuses of the
Miranda process); and Danielle E. Chojnacki, Michael D. Cicchini &
Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2008) (advocating for
legal reforms to counter the coercive police tactics that induce false
confessions).
67 One of the authors advocating the race-based theory briefly touches on
this issue of charge-stacking, but in a different context. See Rachel
Moran, supra note 21, at 41 (discussing and disagreeing with the
argument that the prosecutor’s use of the disorderly conduct charge can
actually benefit the defendant in plea bargaining by saving him or her
from conviction on more serious charges).
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B. THE SAMPLE
Because of the tremendous volume of criminal cases,
any investigation (beyond macro-level statistics) into how
police and prosecutors are using disorderly conduct statutes
will necessarily be limited in its scope. For this investigation,
I analyzed all disorderly conduct charges alleged to have
occurred in July 2018, in the County of Kenosha, State of
Wisconsin.
I used this venue and jurisdiction for several reasons.
First, practicing in Wisconsin, I am familiar with the publicly
available, macro-level information on state disorderly
conduct charges.68 Second, practicing in Kenosha County, I
have relatively easy, quick, and inexpensive access to the
micro-level, publicly available detail that will be needed to
conduct this investigation. 69 And third, I am admittedly
curious to see if the evidence supports my experience-based
views about prosecutorial, rather than police, abuse of the
statute.
Kenosha County is located on the shores of Lake
Michigan in the southeast corner of Wisconsin in the I-94
Milwaukee-Chicago corridor; it is about thirty minutes south
of Milwaukee and less than sixty minutes north of Chicago.70
The County has a population of 169,561, which includes a
population of 99,944 in the City. 71 Based on my nearly
twenty years of practicing criminal defense in Kenosha, I am
confident that the City accounts for a disproportionately high
percentage of criminal cases, as is probably true of most
intra-county, urban-suburban settings across the country.
The City is comprised of 51.0% female and 49.0% male. 72
The percentage of the City’s population that is “White alone,
The database of cases in the Appendix is drawn from public
information on the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, at
https://wcca.wicourts.gov/case.html.
69 This information, including the criminal complaint which sets forth the
facts on which a defendant’s charges are based, is available to the public
at the Kenosha County Clerk of Circuit Court’s office.
70 THE CITY OF KENOSHA: VISITORS (accessed April 26, 2021), at
https://www.kenosha.org/visitors.
71 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: QUICK FACTS, Kenosha Wisconsin (Population
Estimates, July 1, 2019), at
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/kenoshacountywisconsin,ke
noshacitywisconsin/PST045219.
72 Id.
68
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not Hispanic or Latino” is 66.1%, “Hispanic or Latino” is
17.8%, “African American alone” is 11.5%, with other races
accounting for the balance.73
To give the politically popular race-motivated theory
of disorderly conduct a puncher’s chance of being
substantiated, I selected all instances of criminal disorderly
conduct allegedly committed in July 2018.
I selected the month of July because if the police are
surveilling individuals for signs of disorder based on their
race, those individuals would probably have to be outdoors
where the police can see them. This is far more likely to
happen in July than it is, say, in Wisconsin’s cold winter
months.74 Further, July provides a good-sized sample: this
single month, while roughly 8.3% of a calendar year, contains
11% of all disorderly conduct charges in 2018. 75 This
disproportionately high number for July is not surprising, as
research psychologists have established a cause-and-effect
relationship between hot temperatures and acts of
aggression that would qualify as disorderly.76
I selected the year 2018 for two reasons. I wanted a
fairly recent sample, but I also wanted enough time for most,
if not all, of the cases to be resolved. Given that I conducted
my computer search in April 2021, this allowed nearly three
years from the date of the alleged disorderly conduct (which
would have been sometime in July 2018) for the cases to
resolve by plea, dismissal, or trial. In my own experience,
criminal cases are filed fairly quickly after an alleged
Id.
See Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 33, 33 (2001) (“[M]ore assaults occur during the
summer months than during other months . . . people are outside more in
the summer”).
75 Compare Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Kenosha County, Statues
947.01 and 947.01 (1), Offense Range 7/01/2018 to 7/31/2018 (99 counts
in 90 cases) with Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Kenosha County,
Statues 947.01 and 947.01 (1), Offense Range 1/01/2018 to 12/31/2018
(900 counts in 848 cases).
76 Craig Anderson, supra note 74, at 35 (“Field studies consistently find
positive associations between uncomfortable heat and aggression. . . .
The consistency of findings across many settings and methods provides
strong support for the causal version of the heat hypothesis, even from
correlational studies.”) (emphasis added). In a broad range of studies,
“[a]ggression—as measured by assault rates, spontaneous riots, spouse
batterings, and batters being hit by pitched baseballs—is higher during
hotter days, months, seasons, and years.” Id. at 34.
73
74
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incident—usually within days and nearly always within
months—and very few cases, once filed, take longer than two
years to resolve.
In addition to my selected timeframe of July 2018,
Kenosha itself appears to be a good location from which to
draw a sample that would substantiate the race-motivated
theory of disorderly conduct, if the theory is true. There are
two reasons for this. First, Kenosha law enforcement is
viewed by many as being racist. Granted, such opinions are
often based on a small sample of cases, 77 are sometimes
rooted in false information, 78 and usually ignore relevant
facts.79 But the racist reputation exists nonetheless.80
Second, Kenosha law enforcement and prosecutors
have a reputation among the defense bar for being aggressive
with criminal charges and, in particular, with the disorderly
conduct statute.
A simple macro-level comparison of
Kenosha and Milwaukee indicates that this reputation may
be justified. As explained below, in July 2018, there were 99
counts of disorderly conduct in 90 different criminal cases in
See Aisha I. Jefferson, Kenosha Residents Say the Way the Police
Handled the 2 Shootings this Week Tell [sic] You All You Need to Know
About Whether the City is Racist, INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2020), at
https://www.insider.com/kenosha-race-relations-jacob-blake-police-kylerittenhouse-shootings-2020-8.
78 See id. The article, along with countless others, alleged that Jacob
Blake was “unarmed” and was “shot in the back seven times,” both of
which are false. See Michael D. Graveley, Report of the Officer Involved
Shooting of Jacob Blake (Jan. 5, 2021), at
https://www.kenoshacounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/11827/Report-onthe-Officer-Involved-Shooting-of-Jacob-Blake. More specifically, “[a]s he
resisted arrest, Jacob Blake was armed with a knife.” Id. at 3. Further,
when shots were eventually fired, three of them were “to his left side
(flank).” Id. The significance of this is explained in the report. See id.
79 For example, in the Blake shooting, it frequently goes unreported that
the complaining witness, an African-American woman, summoned the
police because Blake was allegedly taking her vehicle and her children
without her consent and, when the police arrived on scene, she “flagged
them down and shouted statements identifying Jacob Blake as the other
person involved and indicating that he was trying to take her car,
stating, ‘My kids are in the car.’” Id. at 2-3.
80 For another recent example, see Katie Shepard, “They Just Need to
Disappear”: Kenosha Sheriff Once Called for Black Shoplifters to be
“Warehoused” and Kept from Having Children, WASH. POST (Aug. 28,
2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/28/kenoshasheriff-aclu-protests-rittenhouse/. To offer a mild defense of the Sheriff,
although his comments are stupid, they seem to be focused on the
defendants’ alleged conduct rather than their race.
77
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Kenosha County. 81 By comparison, there were only 201
counts of disorderly conduct in 193 such cases in Milwaukee
County in that same timeframe.82 The upshot: Kenosha had
about 50% of the disorderly conduct charges and cases as
Milwaukee, even though Kenosha is a fraction of the size
with a mere 17% of Milwaukee’s population.83
For all of the above reasons, the sample of cases
investigated in this article would likely substantiate the racemotivated theory of disorderly conduct, if the theory is true.
That is, if disorderly conduct statutes are being abused by
racist police, one would expect to find such abuse in
Kenosha—a county with allegedly racist law enforcement
agencies which, along with the county’s district attorney’s
office, are known for aggressively using the statute.
Returning to the sample of cases discussed above,
then, the 90 Kenosha criminal cases included three cases
alleging disorderly conduct inside the Kenosha County Jail.
As these cases would offer no insight into police surveillance
practices, I excluded them from the sample which left a total
of 87 criminal cases.
Two of these 87 cases each charged two counts of
disorderly conduct for two separate dates. Similarly, one of
the 87 cases charged three counts of disorderly conduct for
three separate dates. Because each count was separated by
time and circumstances, I considered each count to be its own
case. I, therefore, designated the case numbers with a suffix
of either –a, –b, or –c in the table of cases in the Appendix.
This increased the sample to 91 disorderly conduct “cases.”84
See Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Kenosha County, Statues 947.01
and 947.01 (1), Offense Range 7/01/2018 to 7/31/2018.
82 See Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Milwaukee County, Statues 947.01
and 947.01 (1), Offense Range 7/01/2018 to 7/31/2018.
83 This population statistic is true with regard to the respective counties
and cities. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: QUICK FACTS, Kenosha
Wisconsin (Population Estimates, July 1, 2019) with U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU: QUICK FACTS, Milwaukee Wisconsin (Population Estimates, July
1, 2019) in the searchable database at
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219. There could
be reasons other than aggressive law enforcement for the discrepancy,
e.g., Kenosha residents may simply be more disorderly and/or more eager
to summon the police than are Milwaukee residents. Therefore, while
these statistics support the claim that the Kenosha authorities are more
aggressive in their use of the disorderly conduct statute, these statistics
do not, by themselves, prove the truth of the claim.
84 See APPENDIX.
81
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In another three of these 91 cases, multiple counts of
disorderly conduct (two counts in two cases and four counts
in another case) were charged for the same date. Because
these charges were not different in time and circumstances,
I did not separate them for the analysis. The sample size,
therefore, remained at 91 disorderly conduct cases, with a
total of 96 disorderly conduct charges, all of which are
detailed in the table of cases in the Appendix.

C. MACRO-LEVEL FINDINGS
Given this article’s first hypothesis that the racemotivated theory of disorderly conduct will not be
substantiated, i.e., that the disorderly conduct statute is not
being used as a police tool to surveil African Americans, a
significant preliminary finding is the race of the defendants
charged with disorderly conduct.
In the 91 cases in the sample, 63 (or 69.2%) of the
defendants are “Caucasian,” 23 (or 25.3%) are “AfricanAmerican,” four (or 4.4%) are “Hispanic,” and one (or 1.1%)
is “Asian.”85 Because most crime occurs in the City, rather
than the surrounding areas, the relevant demographic for
purpose of comparison is probably the City. Nonetheless, the
comparisons with both the City and County populations are
as follows:
Race of
Defendant /
Population
Caucasian /
White alone,
not Hispanic
or Latino
African
American /
African
American
alone
Hispanic /
Hispanic or
Latino
85

See id.

No. of
D.C.
Cases
63

Pct. of
D.C.
Cases
69.2%

City
Pop.

County
Pop.

66.1%

75.4%

23

25.3%

11.5%

7.4%

4

4.4%

17.8%

13.5%
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1

1.1%

4.6%

3.7%

91

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

When using the City’s population for comparison, it
appears that Hispanics are significantly undercharged
relative to their population, while African Americans are
significantly overcharged relative to their population.
The difference between the Hispanic charging rate
and population may be due to inconsistent classifications of
race between the Kenosha County District Attorney’s Office
and the U.S. Census Bureau. In other words, is the District
Attorney’s classification of “Caucasian” the same as the
Census Bureau’s “White alone, not Hispanic or Latino”? If
not, then the numbers are not comparable.
Concerning African Americans, however, such classification
issues probably do not exist. Therefore, the disproportionate
prosecution of African Americans relative to their population
in the City—25.3% of the cases versus 11.5% of the
population—is most likely a real and significant difference,86
and it is certainly worth investigating.
It would be a mistake to simply attribute this
difference to racist policing without further investigation.
For example, one professor argues—citing national arrest
statistics that are very comparable to the charging statistics
in this article—that “[t]he disproportionate racial impacts of
policing disorder are apparent in statistics on disorderly
conduct arrests.” 87 The level of analysis that went into
reaching that particular conclusion is unclear, but that type
of claim, without more, may very well confuse correlation
with causation. That is, we must not simply assume as the
cause the very thing to be investigated: racist police
surveillance.
In other words, a higher charging rate for a group,
relative to that group’s percentage of the overall population,
says little or nothing. By analogy, nearly 90% of the
For a discussion of the concept of statistical significance, but in a
different context (i.e., mock juror conviction rates using different burden
of proof instructions), see Michael D. Cicchini, Reasonable Doubt and
Relativity, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1473-74, n. 138-144 (2019).
87 Jamelia Morgan, supra note 21, at 23.
86
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disorderly conduct cases in this article’s sample were filed
against men, 88 yet men account for less than half of the
population in both the City and the County. 89 Without
further investigation, however, we could not properly
conclude that the disproportionate charging is due to sexist
or anti-male policing. Rather, there could be numerous other
explanations for the difference.
Similarly, to determine whether there is evidence of
racist police surveillance for disorderly acts, we will have to
dig deeper into the numbers and consider the following,
additional statistics. (The next Part will then examine these
statistics and explore other facts in some of the underlying
cases.)
Most significantly, 59 of the 91 disorderly conduct
cases are classified as domestic violence.90 This constitutes
65%, or nearly two-thirds, of all cases. An even higher
percentage—70% (16 out of 23)—of the disorderly conduct
cases filed against African Americans are classified as
domestic violence.91 The meaning and significance of this
domestic violence label will be discussed in the next Part.
Seventy-five (82.4%) of the 91 disorderly conduct
cases also include charges other than disorderly conduct.92 A
mere 16 cases (17.6%) involve a charge or charges only of
disorderly conduct.93
The disorderly conduct charge is most commonly
paired with a battery-related charge. In 52 (57.1%) of the 91
disorderly conduct cases, the complaint charged one of the
battery statutes, a child abuse statute, or both, and then
tacked on a disorderly conduct charge.94 Many of those 52
cases also include additional counts, such as strangulation,
intimidation of a victim, and false imprisonment.95
See APPENDIX.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: QUICK FACTS, Kenosha Wisconsin (Population
Estimates, July 1, 2019) (“Female persons, percent” is 50.5% for the
County and 51.0% for the City of Kenosha), at
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/kenoshacountywisconsin,ke
noshacitywisconsin/PST045219.
90 See APPENDIX. Domestic violence or domestic abuse cases are
denominated with “DV”.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. Battery was by far the most common, as 49 cases paired the
disorderly conduct charge with one of the criminal battery statutes.
95 See id.
88
89

70

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2021)

Of the multi-count cases that did not charge some
form of battery or child abuse, a common pairing for the
disorderly conduct charge was criminal damage to
property.96 Ten of the 91 disorderly conduct cases (11%) did
not include a battery or child abuse charge but did pair
disorderly conduct with underlying criminal damage to
property charge, sometimes with yet additional charges.97
As far as the disposition of the 91 cases, 76 cases were
resolved by a plea deal, one of which involved a plea of not
guilty because of mental disease or defect (NGI), and 15 cases
were dismissed. 98 Some of these 15 cases were no doubt
dismissed as part of a larger plea deal, as some defendants
had other cases as well. However, those companion cases
would not appear in the sample unless their alleged crimes
were also in the same timeframe (July 2018) and also
included a disorderly conduct charge.
The important statistic in this regard is that out of
the 91 cases that included a count of disorderly conduct, not
a single case went to a jury trial. Rather, 100 percent were
resolved by a plea bargain or, in a few cases, possibly with
an outright dismissal. Of the 75 cases that were known to
have resolved by a plea agreement and did not involve an
NGI plea, 51 cases (or 68%) included a plea to disorderly
conduct (and sometimes to other charges as well), and 24
cases (or 32%) resulted in a plea to an underlying charge or
charges but not to disorderly conduct.99
With these macro-level statistics at our disposal, the
next Part will dive deeper into the numbers and some casespecific details to investigate this article’s two hypotheses.

V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The analysis of the above data can be broken down
into two parts which parallel the two, independent
hypotheses. First, does the sample of cases substantiate the
race-motivated theory of disorderly conduct? (I hypothesized
the sample would not substantiate the theory.) And second,

See id.
See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
96
97
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regardless of whether it is substantiated, does the sample of
cases support this article’s charge-stacking hypothesis?

A. RACE-MOTIVATED THEORY OF DISORDERLY
CONDUCT
As explained above, African Americans comprise 11.5%
of the City’s population (and an even smaller 7.4% of the
County’s population), yet account for 25.3% of the defendants
in disorderly conduct cases. Also as discussed above, there
could be many reasons for this disparity, one of which is that
the police are actively surveilling African Americans for
signs of disorder, which leads to more and disproportionate
charges.
Upon examining the data, however, that potential
explanation can be ruled out. Why? To begin, the majority
of disorderly conduct cases in the sample—roughly 65% of all
cases and nearly 70% of cases with African American
defendants—are domestic violence (a/k/a domestic abuse)
cases.100
Race of Defendant
Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian

No. of
D.C.
Cases
63
23
4
1
91

No. of
D.V.
Cases
39
16
3
1
59

Pct. of
D.V.
Cases
61.9%
69.6%
75.0%
100.0%
64.8%

The significance of labeling a disorderly conduct case
as domestic abuse is explained below. But first, what is
domestic abuse? In Wisconsin, it is not a crime in itself, but
rather a classification. For a charged crime to be a crime of
domestic abuse there must be a qualifying relationship and
a qualifying act. Regarding the relationship, the defendant
must be “an adult person” and the alleged victim must be
“his or her spouse or former spouse,” or “an adult with whom
See APPENDIX. The table of cases in the Appendix is sorted first by
race, and then by whether the case is domestic violence related which
denominated with “DV”.
100
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the [defendant] resides or formerly resided,” or “an adult
with whom the [defendant] has a child in common.”101
Regarding the act, it must be alleged that the defendant
engaged in at least one of the following:
1. Intentional infliction of physical pain,
physical injury or illness.
2. Intentional
impairment
of
physical
condition.
3. A violation of [first, second, or third degree
sexual assault].
4. A physical act that may cause the other
person reasonably to fear imminent
engagement in the conduct described under
subd. 1., 2. or 3.102
As long as there is a qualifying relationship, a battery
charge necessarily constitutes domestic abuse under part 1.
But the domestic abuse label is much broader than that.
Charges of criminal damage to property and disorderly
conduct, for example, easily qualify under part 4.
But why is the domestic violence label important for
purposes of this article’s investigation into alleged racist
police surveillance? Most significantly, unlike other crimes
such as traffic violations, prostitution, many drug
transactions, or possibly even non-domestic disorderly
conduct crimes, the police do not—and, as a practical matter,
can not—surveil or patrol for crimes of domestic abuse.
Rather, the police are responding to 911 calls from, or on
behalf of, alleged victims.
For example, in case number 18cf744 with an African
American defendant, the police “responded to a call for a
disturbance” and, upon arrival, spoke to the complaining
witness.103 Among other allegations, she told the police that
the defendant, her live-in boyfriend, “had punched [her] in
the face with a closed fist, hitting her on the left side of her
face, causing her pain.” 104 The police officer reported

WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (1) (a).
Id.
103 Criminal Complaint at 3, Wisconsin v. Ferguson, No. 18-CF-744 (Cir.
Ct. Kenosha County, July 17, 2018) (on file with author).
104 Id.
101
102
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“observ[ing] redness to the left side of her face.”105 The police
eventually arrested the defendant who was charged with
crimes of domestic abuse, including battery and disorderly
conduct.106
Similarly, in case number 18cm902, also filed against
an African American defendant, the police responded to
another domestic incident.107 In that case, the complaining
witness “stated that just prior to calling the police, she was
at her residence with the defendant,” her husband. 108
According to the complaint, she “was very upset and crying,
and reported that her husband pointed a gun at her.”109 The
defendant allegedly admitted that the gun was loaded and
he intended “to scare” his wife with it.110 He was charged
with disorderly conduct with a weapon, as a domestic abuse
crime.111
In domestic disturbances, the alleged victim does not
necessarily make the initial call to police, but the relevant
point is that the police are still summoned by a citizen
witness and then speak to the alleged victim. For example,
in case number 18cf799, which also charged an African
American defendant, a citizen witness called 911 to report a
public fight.112 The police went to the scene and then to the
hospital where the alleged victim was being treated for head
wounds. 113 She told the police that her live-in boyfriend
struck her during their public argument.114 The defendant

Id.
Id. at 1-3. The defendant was also charged with other, unrelated
crimes that centered on the facts and circumstances of his arrest. After
leaving the scene and upon arrest, he was also charged with driving a
motor vehicle without a valid license (second offense) and resisting
arrest. In addition to those charges and the domestic-related charges,
the defendant was also charged with bail jumping for allegedly driving
without a license (second offense) while out-of-custody on bond for a
separate case of driving a motor vehicle without a valid license (first
offense). Id.
107 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Carr, No. 18-CM-902 (Cir. Ct.
Kenosha County, July 17, 2018) (on file with author).
108 Id. at 2.
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id. at 2.
111 Id. at 1.
112 Criminal Complaint at 2, Wisconsin v. Kimbrough, No. 18-CF-799
(Cir. Ct. Kenosha County, July 30, 2018) (on file with author).
113 Id.
114 Id.
105
106

74

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2021)

was then charged with substantial battery and disorderly
conduct as domestic abuse crimes.115
As these typical examples of domestic abuse
demonstrate, the police are not surveilling anyone; rather,
they are responding to calls for help. Or, as one level-headed
and well-grounded academic put it: “I’ve noted repeatedly
(but no one else ever seems to be aware) when the police
make contact with a suspect, this is usually because a citizen
called the police to report possible criminal behavior by
someone . . .” 116 This assertion is not necessarily true in
every type of case, but it is true in nearly 100 percent of
domestic abuse cases. Further, the person calling the police
or making the allegation (or both) necessarily has an
intimate relationship with the defendant and is often, if not
usually, of the same race as the defendant.117
Returning, then, to the sample of cases, because 70%
of the cases involving African American defendants are
domestic in nature, we know that the police are not
surveilling anyone for any reason in those cases, but rather
are summoned by, or on behalf of, someone who has an
intimate, domestic relationship with the defendant.
But what about the other seven (30%) of the cases in
the sample that were filed against African Americans?118 It
is possible that, concerning those non-domestic allegations,
the police could have used the statute to actively surveil and
target suspects based on race. But once again, a deeper
examination reveals that surveillance (race-motivated or
otherwise) was not the underlying basis for those cases.
Three of the non-domestic disorderly conduct cases
were very similar to the typical domestic abuse situation but
were not classified as such because the complaining witness
and defendant did not qualify for domestic status under the
Id. at 1.
Michael Huemer, Simple Truths, I: Police Violence, FAKE NOUS (Apr.
24, 2021) (parenthetical in original) (emphasis added), at
https://fakenous.net/?p=2271.
117 See, e.g., Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the
U.S. 50 Years After Loving v. Virginia, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: SOCIAL &
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (May 18, 2017) (Only “one-in-ten married people
in 2015—not just those who recently married—had a spouse of a
different race or ethnicity.”). This statistic may not hold for relationships
outside of marriage, yet it is probably very safe to assume that most
intimate relationships are between individuals of the same race.
118 See APPENDIX.
115
116
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statute. Most commonly, this means the couple was in a
dating relationship but never formally resided together and
did not have a child in common. Nonetheless, the police were
not surveilling for criminal activity; rather, a citizen witness
called the police and summoned them to the scene to report
a crime.
In 18cm971, the defendant was charged with
disorderly conduct after the caller complained that the
defendant “was hitting her and would not get out of her
house.” 119 In 18cm842, the defendant was charged with
property damage and disorderly conduct after two citizen
witnesses reported a disturbance involving a female in need
of help.120 The female then reported that she “hid outside in
the yard until police arrived,” at which time she accused the
defendant, her ex-boyfriend, of the crimes. 121 Finally, in
18cm986, the defendant was charged with battery and
disorderly conduct after a citizen witness reported a man
attacking a woman in public. 122 Upon arrival, the alleged
victim complained to police that “[t]he defendant forcefully
grabbed the back of her neck . . . and pushed her up against
the fence” and was “cussing at her and yelling that she was
disrespecting him.”123
Similarly, two of the seven non-domestic cases filed
against African Americans, while not comparable to the
typical domestic scenario, also involved citizen witnesses
summoning the police. In 18cm939, the defendant was
charged with disorderly conduct when “the caller reported
that there were intoxicated subjects”—her friends whom she
previously invited inside—“in the home causing
problems.”124 And in 18cm1029, the defendant was charged
with criminal damage to property and disorderly conduct
when the caller reported that the defendant, whom she knew,

Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Scott, No. 18-CM-971 (Cir. Ct.
Kenosha County, July 30, 2018) (on file with author).
120 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Herron, No. 18-CM-842 (Cir.
Ct. Kenosha County, July 5, 2018) (on file with author).
121 Id. at 3.
122 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Walker, No. 18-CM-986 (Cir.
Ct. Kenosha County, Aug. 1, 2018) (on file with author).
123 Id. at 2.
124 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Clary, No. 18-CM-939 (Cir. Ct.
Kenosha County, July 23, 2018) (on file with author).
119
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“threw a glass bottle at her mother’s car” striking “her rear
window causing it to break.”125
Finally, the last two cases of non-domestic disorderly
conduct filed against African Americans involved unusual
circumstances, but neither of them could be attributed to
race-based surveillance. In 18cf1023, disorderly conduct was
not initially charged at all.126 Rather, the Information—the
charging document that supersedes the complaint in felony
cases 127 —was later amended by the prosecutor to include
disorderly conduct as part of a plea bargain. 128 And in
18cm937, the suspect was arrested and charged with
disorderly conduct when paramedics summoned a police
officer at the scene of an auto accident to report that the
defendant “was threatening them and interfering with their
ability to treat their patient.”129
In sum, the common thread running through all
cases—including the 30% of cases that were non-domestic in
nature—is that in every single disorderly conduct case filed
against an African American defendant, some person called
to report a crime and summoned the police to the scene. In
22 of the 23 cases against African Americans, the person who
summoned the police or reported being victimized (or both)
knew the defendant well, if not intimately. In no case was
any police officer surveilling anyone for crimes of disorder.
This article’s first hypothesis is therefore confirmed.
The sample of cases does not substantiate but directly
contradicts, the race-motivated theory of disorderly conduct
as an explanation for why African Americans are charged at
a disproportionately high rate relative to their population.
Not even a single case with an African American defendant

Criminal Complaint at 2-3, Wisconsin v. Terrien-Body, No. 18-CM1029 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha County, August 13, 2018) (on file with author).
126 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Murray, No. 18-CF-1023 (Cir.
Ct. Kenosha County, September 20, 2018) (charging a single count of
attempting to flee or elude an officer) (on file with author).
127 See WIS. STAT. § 971.01.
128 See Circuit Court Access, Court Record of Events, Wisconsin v.
Murray, No. 18-CF-1023 (Cir. Ct. Kenosha County, July 18, 2019) (“state
files amended information” at “plea sentencing hearing”), at
https://wcca.wicourts.gov/caseDetail.html?caseNo=2018CF001023&count
yNo=30&index=0&mode=details#records.
129 Criminal Complaint at 1, Wisconsin v. Reaves, No. 18-CM-937 (Cir.
Ct. Kenosha County, July 23, 2018) (on file with author).
125
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involved police surveillance of any kind, whether race-based
or otherwise.

B. PROSECUTORIAL CHARGE-STACKING
Just because there is no evidence that the police are
surveilling African Americans for arrest and prosecution for
disorderly conduct, it does not mean the statute isn’t being
abused in some way (perhaps in a nonracial way) by some
government agent.
In the second of this article’s two independent
hypotheses, I assert that prosecutors are abusing the
disorderly conduct statute in a race-neutral way: they are
tacking it on to the underlying charge or charges to force the
defendant into a plea bargain instead of going to trial.130 One
author explains this prosecutorial tactic of charge-stacking
as follows:
[P]rosecutors will “stack charges” against a
defendant . . . and then approach the
defendant with a “plea deal” that would result
in a guaranteed, substantially reduced
charge[s] and sentence if the defendant agrees
to plead guilty to [one of the charges]. If the
defendant takes the deal, the prosecutor
doesn’t have to take the case to trial . . . which
[is] a lot of work and require[s] a lot of time on
the part of the prosecutor. This has become
absolutely standard practice. The prosecutor
will “stack” charges . . . [and] even actually
innocent people will be intimidated into
pleading guilty, rather than face what’s called
the “trial penalty”—that very scary long
sentence if they should somehow be convicted
[of both charges] at trial. Not surprisingly, the
nature of the deal offered by the prosecutor
will be driven by how strong a case he/she

I stand by this label of “abuse.” However, this should not be confused
with an ethics violation. Charge-stacking is so widespread (well beyond
the use of the disorderly conduct statute discussed in this article) that if
the practice were an ethics violation, nearly every prosecutor would be
disbarred.
130
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thinks they would have in court—the weaker
the case, the better the deal.131

Is there any evidence in the sample of cases to support this
charge-stacking hypothesis? As discussed earlier, in only 16
of the 91 cases (17.6%), disorderly conduct was the only crime
charged. 132 In the large majority of cases, 75 of the 91
(82.4%), disorderly conduct was tacked on to another charge
or other charges allegedly occurring in the same incident.133
Further, 100% of the time the cases in the sample were
resolved by plea bargain or were dismissed—and some, if not
most, of those dismissals were part of a larger, multi-case
plea bargain.134
In other words, charge-stacking was highly prevalent
and not a single case went to trial. However, it is important
to draw a distinction here. While the investigation in this
article proves the practice of charge-stacking, it does not
necessarily prove that it is the direct or only cause of the
observed, zero-percent trial rate. It is possible those cases

Phil Locke, Prosecutors, Charge Stacking, and Plea Deals, WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 12, 2015) (emphasis added), at
https://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2015/06/12/prosecutors-chargestacking-and-plea-deals/. For a more detailed discussion of chargestacking, see Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting
Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1121 (2005) (“Redundant charging can skew
plea bargaining . . . Most obviously, multiple charges intimidate
defendants.”); Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea
Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (2018) (“[T]he prosecutor can
inflate the quantity of charges the defendant faces, by piling on
overlapping, largely duplicative offenses—increasing with each new
charge the defendant’s potential sentence, his risk of conviction, and the
‘sticker shock’ of intimidation that accompanies a hefty charging
instrument.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 594 (2001) (discussing “charge-stacking”);
Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 878 (1995) (discussing “horizontal overcharging”); Andrew D.
Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1143 (2005) (“A defendant who is guilty of one
charge but innocent of another may find it difficult” to defend both).
132 See APPENDIX.
133 See id.
134 See id.
131
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would have been resolved by plea bargain anyway, even
without charge-stacking.135
Nonetheless, while this investigation does not in
itself prove a cause-and-effect relationship, it “does waggle
its eyebrows suggestively and gesture furtively while
mouthing ‘look over there’” in the direction of causation.136
And charge-stacking is more likely to have an impact on plea
bargaining in the two-count cases. The reason is that, with
only one underlying count, the disorderly conduct tack-on
charge takes on greater significance in plea negotiations.
This becomes clearer by focusing on a subset of the
two-count cases in the sample. In 39 of 91 cases (42.9%), the
defendant was charged with precisely two counts: a single,
underlying count of some kind, and a disorderly conduct
tack-on charge. 137 Twenty-seven of these 39 cases are
The reality is that the vast majority of criminal cases in all federal
and state jurisdictions resolve by plea bargain for a variety of reasons.
See Darryl K. Brown, Response, What’s the Matter with Kansas—and
Utah?: Explaining Judicial Interventions in Plea Bargaining, 95 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 47, 62 (2017) (“All this has allowed state and federal
courts to reach guilty plea rates of 96 to 99 percent.”); John H.. Langbein,
Torture & Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978) (In some
jurisdictions “as many as 99 percent of all felony convictions are by
plea.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (Plea bargaining “is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”).
Further, charge-stacking with the disorderly conduct statute is
only a single, very limited form of charge-stacking. And in addition to
charge-stacking (with or without the use of disorderly conduct), another
reason for the dominance of plea bargaining may be that some defense
lawyers are averse to trying cases. See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as
a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1769
(2016) (“Too many lawyers appointed to represent poor criminal
defendants do not perform their intended role in the system, because
they have been conditioned not to fight for their clients”).
136CAUSEWEB.ORG, Munroe on Correlation (accessed May 8, 2021), at
https://www.causeweb.org/cause/resources/fun/quotes/munroecorrelation.
137 See APPENDIX. For purposes of determining the number of counts, bail
jumping charges are disregarded. Further, the 39 cases are a subset of
two-count cases. There were additional two-count cases in the sample,
but in those cases it is not necessarily clear that the disorderly conduct
charge was tacked-on to an underlying crime; therefore, such cases are
not included in the subset of the 39 two-count cases that I discuss here.
For example, in 18cm979 the defendant is charged with two counts:
carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) and disorderly conduct. However,
the disorderly conduct may not be a tack-on charge. Rather, it might be
135
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battery cases, another eight are criminal damage to property,
two are child abuse, one is strangulation, and one is violating
a domestic no-contact order—and in each of these 39 cases,
the prosecutor tacked on a disorderly conduct charge to make
a two-count case out of a single incident.138
But how can the prosecutor charge the defendant
with a primary, underlying crime (usually battery) and then
tack on a second crime (disorderly conduct) for the same
alleged act? How does that type of charge-stacking not
violate double jeopardy? The legal gymnastics that permit it
are best illustrated by focusing on the battery-disorderly
conduct example. This familiar two-charge combination
accounts for 27 of the cases described above, which is a
whopping 30%, or nearly one-third, of all cases in the entire
sample.139
This two-charge combination was also the subject of
the appeal in State v. Kanarowski, wherein the defendant
was charged with battery and a disorderly conduct tack-on
(and two more crimes not relevant for our analysis) for
allegedly hitting the complaining witness with a baseball
bat.140 The defendant argued that he cannot be charged with
two crimes for the same act, as “[t]he constitutional
protections against double jeopardy in a single prosecution
are meant to prevent a single offense from being arbitrarily
transformed into multiple offenses with multiple
punishments.”141
In response, the court held that the applicable test is
whether “each charged offense require[s] proof of an element
or fact that the other does not.” 142 If each does, then
transforming the defendant’s single act (swinging the
baseball bat) into two offenses (battery and disorderly
conduct) would not be arbitrary and, therefore, would be
permitted. The court elaborated: on the one hand, battery
requires proof that the victim suffered bodily harm without
consent and that the defendant had the “intent to cause
the primary, underlying charge with the CCW charge being added for a
weapon that may have been found on the defendant’s person upon his
arrest.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 State v. Kanarowski, 489 N.W.2d 660, 661 (1992).
141 Id. at 662.
142 Id. (discussing the so-called Blockburger test set forth in Blockburger
v. U.S. 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
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bodily harm,”143 whereas disorderly conduct does not; on the
other hand, the court continued, disorderly conduct requires
proof that the defendant’s conduct was “violent . . . and
tended to cause or provoke a disturbance,” 144 whereas
battery does not.
According to the court, because each crime requires
proof of an element that the other does not—bodily harm for
battery and a disturbance for disorderly conduct—
transforming the defendant’s single offense into two
different crimes is not arbitrary and, therefore, is permitted.
In other words, even though hitting someone with a baseball
bat is one act, the battery and disorderly conduct are “based
upon different facts, not the same fact.”145 One “fact” is that
the defendant intentionally caused bodily harm; the other
“fact” is that the defendant also caused or provoked a
disturbance.146
In reality, it is certainly true that a person can
commit disorderly conduct without committing a battery—as
we’ve learned, even a lawyer attempting to visit a client at a
government building during regular business hours can be
disorderly.147 But as a practical matter, in most imaginable
circumstances can a person really commit a battery without
also being disorderly? In the baseball-bat case, doesn’t
causing pain or injury necessarily cause a disturbance?
Wouldn’t the crime victim who suffers bodily harm also
necessarily be disturbed—or at least “tend to” be disturbed,
which is all that the disorderly conduct statute requires?148
Isn’t breaking this fact into two different “facts” just a

Id.
Id.
145 Id. In the court’s reasoning, the fact that the defendant’s battery
“drew a crowd and . . . the police [were] summoned” is evidence of the
disturbance, thus justifying the disorderly conduct. In the domestic
context, there usually isn’t a crowd to witness the battery yet the police
are still “summoned,” which is evidence that the complaining witness
was disturbed. This is enough to pass the Blockburger elements-only
test. And in cases of disorderly conduct, recall that an actual disturbance
is not even needed. Rather, the test is whether the defendant’s conduct
(the battery) is such that it merely “tends to cause” a disturbance. WIS.
STAT. § 947.01 (1).
146 Id.
147 See Part II.A.
148 WIS. STAT. § 947.01 (1).
143
144
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disingenuous way to double up the charges and pile on the
defendant?149
In commonsense layman terms, disorderly conduct is
(almost always) inherent in or included within a battery
crime. But because the test is not one of commonsense, but
rather is the hyper-technical elements-only test, the state
may charge battery and disorderly conduct for a single
incident (or even a single act), thus giving the prosecutor the
bargaining power to offer dismissal of one count in exchange
for a plea to the other.150 Which count stays and which one
goes, of course, depends on the perceived strength of the case.
But either way, having two counts with which to wheel-anddeal dramatically increases the prosecutor’s chance of
getting the desired conviction without the inconvenience and
risk of a jury trial.
In the sample, of the 39 two-count cases described
above, 33 are known to have been resolved by plea bargain.151
The remaining six were dismissed, 152 though probably as
part of a larger plea deal involving another case that does not
appear in the sample. The results of those 33 known plea
bargains are as follows:

See Michael Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, supra note 131, at 1113
(discussing the prosecutor’s ability “to shape the contours of a crime and
to split it up—perhaps arbitrarily—into many different but overlapping
counts.”).
150 See id. at 1121-24 (discussing the elements-only test and reasonable
alternatives to it).
151 See APPENDIX.
152 See id.
149
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Underlying
Charge

No. of
Cases

Plea to
D.C. 154

Pct.
D.C.

23

Plea to
underlying
charge 153
9 155

Battery (+
D.C.)
Crim.
Damage to
Prop. (+
D.C.)
Child Abuse
(+ D.C.)
Violate DV
No-Contact
(+ D.C.)

15

65.2%

7

2

5

71.4%

2

1

1

50.0%

1

0

1

100.0%

33

12

22

66.7%

Put another way, we know that no cases in the sample
went to trial. We can also safely assume that in over onethird of the cases (33 of 91), and probably more, the
prosecutor was able to use the disorderly conduct charge to
force the defendant into a plea bargain. 156 In about twothirds of those 33 cases, the prosecutor offered a plea to the
less serious disorderly conduct in exchange for dismissal of
the primary charge (most commonly, battery). In roughly
In 18cm999, a battery case, the defendant also had a bail jumping
charge, but such charges are ignored for purposes of this article.
Further, the bail jumping charge (not the battery charge) is actually the
underlying count to which the defendant entered a plea. In 18cf810, also
a battery case, the defendant entered a plea to disorderly conduct and
also to a reduced battery charge. This plea to battery is not included in
this “underlying charge” column because the plea was to a modified or
reduced charge.
154 In 18cm953, a battery case, and 18cm974, a criminal damage to
property case, the defendants entered pleas to disorderly conduct as part
of a deferred prosecution agreement.
155 In 18cm992, the defendant entered pleas to both the underling battery
and the disorderly conduct. This is why the table indicates pleas to 24
counts (nine underlying charges and 15 disorderly conduct charges), even
though there are only 23 cases in that row. In all of the other two-count
cases, the defendant entered a plea to one count in exchange for the
dismissal (or in one instance, the reduction) of the other.
156 I limit my claim to the 33 two-count cases, however, because even
though the prosecutor obtained a plea in many more cases, those other
cases had more than two counts. The more counts the prosecutor has at
his or her disposal, the less impact a single count of disorderly conduct
will have in plea bargaining.
153
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the other one-third, the prosecutor induced a plea to the more
serious charge by offering to dismiss the disorderly conduct.
But while this investigation demonstrates that
charge-stacking is highly prevalent in the sample, it has not
yet demonstrated the extent of the practice—not even in the
county from which the sample was drawn. In other words,
we know that whenever disorderly conduct was charged, in
the vast majority of cases it was used as a tack-on to another
charge—typically battery or property damage. But how
often was battery or property damage charged without
tacking on a disorderly conduct count? Such cases, sans
disorderly conduct, would not have appeared in the sample.
If there are a high number of such cases, then the practice of
charge-stacking may not be that widespread.
This question is easily answered with two additional
searches. It turns out that charge-stacking is not just
widespread, but habitual—i.e., “absolutely standard
practice.” 157 Within the timeframe (July 2018), county
(Kenosha), and state (Wisconsin) under investigation, there
were only three cases that charged some form of battery but
did not also charge disorderly conduct. 158 Similarly, there
was only one case that charged property damage but did not
also charge disorderly conduct. 159 In other words, not
tacking on a disorderly conduct charge in a battery or
property damage case was the rare exception to the rule—so
rare, it may have been a charging oversight.
To summarize, this investigation substantiates the
article’s second hypothesis: it conclusively demonstrates
habitual prosecutorial charge-stacking.
Further, the
complete absence of jury trials in the sample of cases is
consistent with the commonsense claim that prosecutors
stack charges to increase their leverage over defendants and
force them into plea bargains.

VI. LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS
Phil Locke, supra note 131.
See Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Kenosha County, All BatteryRelated Statutes in Ch. 940, Wis. Stats., Offense Range 7/01/2018 to
7/31/2018.
159 The one case is a codefendant case, thus generating two separate case
numbers for a single incident and a single charging decision. See
Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Kenosha County, Statute 943.01,
Offense Range 7/01/2018 to 7/31/2018.
157
158
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One limitation of this investigation is that it tests the
two narrow hypotheses using a sample that is limited in
scope: it was drawn from one county in one state and
investigated only three law enforcement agencies. 160 (The
cases studied were not randomly selected, either, but that is
not a limitation; as explained earlier, the sample was
selected to increase the odds of substantiating the racemotivated theory of disorderly conduct, if the theory was true.
Also as explained earlier, the sample is fairly large, as it
comprises 11% of the disorderly conduct cases in 2018.)
Therefore, while I believe the race-motivated theory
of disorderly conduct is generally implausible, I cannot say
that this investigation debunks the theory on a national or
statewide scale. It would be more accurate to say that the
sample of cases investigated in this article offered no support
whatsoever for the race-motivated theory and, in fact,
completely contradicted it.
But that limitation is also the primary lesson. Policing
is a very local affair. Police practices and policies are
sometimes determined at the state level, 161 and in most
respects at the county or even agency level. 162 Therefore,
broad claims and generalizations about police-related
problems and reforms are usually of little value. When a
police officer commits misconduct, even crimes, against a
suspect in Minneapolis, it says nothing about whether the
police in Seattle or Portland, for example, should be
abolished, defunded, or even reformed. Similarly, even if it
The vast majority of cases in Kenosha County in July 2018 would
have been investigated by the Kenosha Police Department, the Kenosha
Sheriff’s Department, and the Pleasant Prairie Police Department.
(Another potential agency which sees a much lower volume of cases
would have been the Twin Lakes Police Department.).
161 An example of a statewide practice is the state-level mandatory arrest
law in domestic situations, discussed in Part IV.A.
162 See Elizabeth Joh, Policing, Race, & Technology, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV.
ONLINE 84, 84 (2021) (“Like schools and fire departments, policing is
largely a local institution.”). As an example of a difference at the agency
level, even within Kenosha County the three primary law enforcement
agencies are not on the same page with the use of body cameras. See
Deneen Smith, First Body Cameras on the Street for Sheriff’s Deputies,
Testing Beginning for Kenosha Police, KENOSHA NEWS (Apr. 28, 2021) (By
comparison to the Kenosha Sheriff and the Kenosha Police Departments,
“Pleasant Prairie Police [another Kenosha County law enforcement
agency] have had body cameras since 2017.”).
160
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were shown that the police were surveilling African
Americans for disorderly conduct in, say, New York, that
would not support the abolition of the disorderly conducts
statute in, say, Florida or Wisconsin. This is especially true
if the New York law enforcement surveillance practices were
in use many decades ago.163
A secondary lesson relates to claims and evidence.
Those asserting a claim—e.g., that the police are currently
using the disorderly conduct statute to surveil African
Americans for signs of disorder—generally have the burden
to provide evidence in support of that claim.164 And merely
pointing to disproportionate charging of a demographic
group relative to its share of the total population says
absolutely nothing about why that difference exists.
The claims of racist police surveillance for signs of
disorder tend to be advanced by those in academia—a place
where it is currently popular to make sweeping allegations
of racism.165 For example, in what can only be described as
an oddly self-destructive move, the English department at
Rutgers University stated that to promote anti-racism, it will
“deemphasize traditional grammar rules.” 166 Moving from
the perplexing to the disturbing (and from general academia
See Jamelia Morgan, supra note 21, at 7 (discussing the “broken
windows policing initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s” and the “ordermaintenance policing that characterized the vagrancy regimes of the
latter half of the 20th century.”).
164 See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: THE BURDEN OF PROOF (accessed
May 5, 2021) (“[Y]ou simply cannot prove general claims that are
negative claims—one cannot prove that ghosts do not exist; one cannot
prove that leprechauns too do not exist. One simply cannot prove a
negative and general claim.”), at
https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/socialsciences/ppecorino/phil_of_religion_text/C
HAPTER_5_ARGUMENTS_EXPERIENCE/Burden-of-Proof.htm.
165 Both of the authors cited in this article who make claims of racemotivated police surveillance are employed in legal academia. See supra
note 21. This is not surprising for another reason as well: the majority of
all law review articles are written by professors. In one recent study,
more than sixty percent of articles were written by authors who were
already affiliated with law schools. See Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in
Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 309, 319-20 (2013). This strikes
me as an underestimate of the true number; in any case, of the
remaining authors, many are no doubt publishing with the hope of
breaking into the academy’s hallowed ranks.
166 Alex Frank, Rutgers English Department to Deemphasize Traditional
Grammar In Solidarity with Black Lives Matter, COLLEGE FIX (Jul 20,
2020), at https://www.thecollegefix.com/rutgers-english-department-todeemphasize-traditional-grammar-in-solidarity-with-black-lives-matter/.
163
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to legal academia) several law professors at Northwestern
University introduced themselves at a virtual town hall
meeting by obediently announcing: “I am a racist.” 167
Returning to the general academy for a final, headscratching example, students at Georgetown condemned as
racist a minority fellowship program that provides “alumni
mentorship, interview practice, and leadership trips” to
minority students. 168
A primary complaint was the
program’s practical orientation; it should instead have
focused on race-based activism, critics say.169
Certainly, if rules of grammar, liberal law professors,170 and
even fellowship programs designed exclusively for minority
students are called racist, then it is no surprise (and might
even be expected) that those in academia will attempt to
brand the police as racist as well. But such liberal, freewheeling use of the word racism can pose several problems—
assuming that one’s goal is to identify real, contemporary
issues and advocate for meaningful reform.
One problem is that sometimes the evidence
contradicts such claims of police racism.
This was
demonstrated in this article. Allegations of racism should
therefore be made narrowly (e.g., “the police at agency A in
county B of state C are surveilling African Americans for
crimes of disorderly conduct . . .”) and only when grounded in
evidence beyond macro-level arrest or charging statistics.
Otherwise, such allegations lose their effectiveness. Worse
yet, rather than merely falling on deaf ears, blanket claims
of racism can harm. “The most damaging aspect of this
mindset is that it renders impossible the task of rooting out
Chrissy Clark, Northwestern Law Administrators Confess Their
Racism in Online Diversity Session, WASHINGTON FREE BEACON (Sept. 6,
2020), at https://freebeacon.com/campus/northwestern-lawadministrators-confess-their-racism-in-online-diversity-session/; Maria
Lencki, Northwestern Law Faculty Refuses to Explain Why They
Introduced Themselves as Racists, COLLEGE FIX (Sept. 8, 2020), at
https://www.thecollegefix.com/northwestern-law-faculty-refuse-toexplain-why-they-introduced-themselves-as-racists/.
168 Dalton Nunamaker, At Georgetown, Program Supporting Students of
Color Accused of Racism, COLLEGE FIX (Dec. 16, 2020), at
https://www.thecollegefix.com/at-georgetown-program-supportingstudents-of-color-accused-of-racism/.
169 Id.
170 See James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and
2013, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2015) (discussing the gross
overrepresentation of Democrats on law school faculties).
167
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[true] racism.
Falsely assuming that racism is
everywhere . . . is guaranteed to engender resentment and
sow racial division.”171
Blindly placing all problems into the basket of racism
means that, when racism isn’t the real issue, the underlying
problem is overlooked and it gets a free pass.
As
demonstrated by this article, the real problem in the sample
of cases is broader as it affects all defendants, not just
African Americans. And the problem isn’t surveillance by
the police; rather, it is the completely independent problem
of charge-stacking by prosecutors. (As the next Part
demonstrates, even though the problem impacts all
defendants, the associated fix is less extreme than abolishing
the statute.)
In any event, there are also some other limitations of
this article’s investigation and findings. It is possible that
after the police are summoned and respond to a domestic
incident, they then discriminate based on race in deciding
whether to arrest the suspect. Such racism would not be
detected by this investigation; different information would be
needed to test that hypothesis. However, I think that
hypothesis is also unlikely to be substantiated for two
reasons.
First, in many states including Wisconsin, once the
police respond to a call for a domestic disturbance their
discretion is severely restricted by mandatory arrest laws
that govern the domestic setting.172 Under Wisconsin’s law,
the police must arrest the suspect, regardless of race, in most
cases and certainly in every case where there is any
Andrew Doyle, The Anti-Racism Movement is Sowing Deeper
Divisions, THE SPECTATOR (Dec. 5, 2020) (parenthetical added), at
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-anti-racism-movement-is-sowingdeeper-divisions.
172 See WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2) (a) (enumerating several different
circumstances in which a police officer “shall” arrest a domestic abuse
suspect). For a discussion of mandatory arrest laws, see, e.g., Alayna
Bridgett, Mandatory-Arrest Laws and Domestic Violence: How
Mandatory-Arrest Laws Hurt Survivors of Domestic Violence Rather
Than Help Them, 30 HEALTH MATRIX 437 (2020); Alexandra Pavlidakis,
Mandatory Arrest: Past Its Prime, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1201 (2009);
David Hirschel, et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To
What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 255 (2007); Joel Garner, Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence in Virginia, 3 WM. & MARY J.
RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 223 (1997).
171
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“evidence of physical injury,” no matter how slight, “to the
alleged victim.” 173 And because a large percentage of the
domestic cases in the sample involved an underlying crime
of violence with a disorderly tack-on, the police would have
no arrest discretion in most cases.
Second, even if the data were available, how would
one define or measure racism in arrest decisions? Assume,
for example, the unusual case of a domestic disturbance call
where the police do have some discretion in making an arrest.
Then assume the usual situation where the suspect and the
complaining witness are of the same race. The data used in
this investigation do not reveal the race of the complaining
witness, but presumably many (and probably most) domestic
relationships involve parties of the same race.174 Upon being
summoned, would the police be racist for arresting the
defendant or for not arresting the defendant, given that the
complaining witness who is seeking help is also African
American?
One other limitation of this article’s investigation is
that it does not attempt to detect prosecutorial racism if any
exists. Assume the police are doing their jobs under the
mandatory arrest law: when they are summoned to a
domestic incident, they arrest every person, regardless of
race, who is accused of a qualifying crime. Even then, it is
possible that a disproportionately high percentage (relative
to the population) of African Americans is being charged
because the prosecutor’s office is making decisions based on
race.
Once again, this strikes me as highly unlikely—at
least in the county where I practice given the race
consciousness of the prosecutor’s office.175 But even if such a
WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2) (a).
See Livingston, supra note 117.
175 See, e.g., BLM Activist Who Lost Race for Congress and Judge to
Become Kenosha’s Newest [Assistant] Prosecutor, KENOSHA COUNTY EYE
(Apr. 30, 2021) (“BLM sympathizer, Kenosha County District Attorney
Michael Graveley (D) hired [the BLM activist] as an Assistant District
Attorney.”), at http://kenoshacountyeye.com/2021/04/30/blm-activist-wholost-race-for-congress-and-judge-to-become-kenoshas-newest-prosecutor/;
Another Day, Another 32 Pages of Text Messages Between Kenosha DA
Mike Graveley and BLM Extremist Whitney Cabal, KENOSHA COUNTY EYE
(Jan. 28, 2021) (“[T]he two seem to make plans to meet up in person . . .
She then presses him for information on the police shooting of Jacob
173
174
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prosecutorial practice exists, the race of the complaining
witness would also have to play a role in whether a charging
decision could be called racist. Nonetheless, this article’s
investigation does not examine the relevant data and,
therefore, would not detect such race-based prosecutorial
practices, assuming they even exist.176
In sum, the reader should be cautious not to overstate
the findings of this article’s investigation. Just as it is
unwise to make broad, sweeping statements about racism or
racist police practices without sufficient evidence, the reader
must also recognize the limits of this study, including the
geographic scope of its sample and the narrowly drawn
hypotheses it investigates.

VII. RECOMMENDED REFORM
There are very good arguments for abolishing
disorderly conduct statutes. Three of those were discussed
in Parts II.A.–C. And to the extent a particular statute does
not pass constitutional muster—for example, by not
providing sufficient notice of what conduct is criminalized or
by chilling constitutionally protected speech—the statute
most certainly should be (and, in theory, must be) abolished.
However, there are also arguments against
abolishing disorderly conduct statutes, particularly those
that do pass constitutional muster. In a case discussed
earlier, for example, the defendant was alleged to have
Blake.”), at http://kenoshacountyeye.com/2021/01/28/another-dayanother-32-pages-of-text-messages-between-kenosha-da-mike-graveleyand-blm-extremist-whitney-cabal/.
176 Another theoretical possibility—but one that is so fanciful and
unlikely that it is best relegated to this footnote—is that the police are,
in fact, surveilling and arresting African Americans for disorderly
conduct, but the prosecutor’s office is refusing to file charges. Under this
hypothetical scenario, racist police surveillance exists but would escape
detection, as this article studies disorderly conduct charges. It seems
incredibly unlikely, however, that the police would surveil a racial group
for signs of disorder knowing that the prosecutor’s office will not file
disorderly conduct charges against members of that group. Nonetheless,
this theoretical possibility illustrates the potential for differences
between arrest data and charging data. For a general discussion of this
topic, see Michael M. O’Hear, Milwaukee Arrest Trends, 1980-2011 – Part
Three: Chicago Comparisons, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (July 21, 2013),
at https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2013/07/milwaukee-arresttrends-1980-2011-part-three-chicago-comparisons/.
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pointed a loaded gun at his wife in an attempt to scare her
during a domestic argument.177 No other charge was filed.178
Far from the situation of law enforcement allegedly using
“unfettered discretion to harass and arrest people engaged in
relatively harmless conduct,”179 this scenario seems, at least
on its face, to be a legitimate use of the statute. Without the
statute, the prosecutor would have to forego charging such
abusive and even potentially dangerous conduct—unless the
prosecutor could identify a different charge to fit the
allegation which, admittedly, is often possible given today’s
expansive criminal codes.
But legal reform short of abolition can address the
governmental abuse substantiated in this article, i.e.,
prosecutors using disorderly conduct to stack charges to
coerce plea bargains. Assuming, for the sake of argument,
that plea bargaining’s stranglehold on the criminal justice
system is not desirable and that more cases should be tried
by juries to determine guilt or innocence,180 what can be done
about it?
The fix is quite simple. “A rational legislature should
seek to avoid promulgating numerous overlapping and vague
criminal provisions.” 181 And toward that end, there are
Criminal Complaint, Wisconsin v. Carr, No. 18-CM-902 (Cir. Ct.
Kenosha County, July 17, 2018) (on file with author).
178 Id.
179 Rachel Moran, supra note 21, at 33.
180 The scourge of plea bargaining has been well documented and argued.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE
L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) (“[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs the public
interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of
the guilty from the innocent.”); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea
Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U.
L. REV. 63 (2012) (The prosecutorial practice of charge-stacking
“compromises the justice system as a whole.”); Russell D. Covey,
Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 73, 73 (2009) (“Because it is perfectly rational for innocent
defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining might be said to have an
‘innocence problem.’”); F. Andrew Hessick III, Plea Bargaining and
Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel,
and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 233 (2002) (“[T]he prosecutor has
incentives to enter into a plea bargain without much concern as to
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.”); Tina Wan, The
Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional Conditions
Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 REV. L. & SOCIAL
JUSTICE 33 (2207) (Plea bargaining “should be banned and held
unconstitutional.”).
181 Michael Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, supra note 131, at 1119.
177
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currently statutes that limit the number of charges a
prosecutor can file in certain circumstances. For example,
concerning the crimes of (1) repeated acts of sexual assault
of a child within a specified time period and (2) sexual
assault of a child for a single act, one such limiting statute
reads:
The state may not charge in the same action a
defendant with a violation of this section
[repeated acts] and with a violation involving
the same child under s. 948.02 [sexual
assault] . . . unless the other violation occurred
outside of the [specified] time period [of the
repeated acts] . . .182
The above statute may be difficult to understand without
careful parsing and some familiarity with the substantive
statutes to which it relates. But in short, it prevents the
prosecutor from charge-stacking certain sex-related crimes.
And the statute could easily be adapted to prohibit the
prosecutor from tacking on a disorderly conduct charge to its
underlying charge (e.g., battery). Such a limiting statute for
disorderly conduct could read as follows:
The state may not charge a defendant with a
violation of this disorderly conduct statute and
with a violation of any other statute unless the
alleged violation of the other statute is
separated by time, place, and circumstances
from the alleged violation of the disorderly
conduct statute.
This charging limitation would restrict the state’s ability to
stack a disorderly conduct charge onto what is a single-act
criminal allegation and what should be a single-count
criminal complaint. 183
Granted, in cases where the
prosecutor charges a battery or property damage, for
example, he or she could still offer to amend that underlying
WIS. STAT. § 948.025 (3).
For a reform measure that calls on the judiciary, rather than the
legislature, to take sensible action, see Michael Seigel & Christopher
Slobogin, supra note 131, at 1128-30 (“[W]e suggest that the courts use
their common law power to create a ‘law of counts.’”).
182
183
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charge to a disorderly conduct charge to induce a plea.
However, the limiting statute proposed above would still
constrain the prosecutor in two important ways.
First, the prosecutor would not be able to induce a
plea to an underlying charge by offering to dismiss a
disorderly conduct charge, as the initial charging would be
limited to the underlying charge. (It is true that, under the
proposed statute, the prosecutor could opt for charging
disorderly conduct instead of an underlying charge such as
battery or property damage. However, the prosecutor would
rarely do that, as the underlying charge—even when it, too,
is a misdemeanor—will be a more serious charge than
disorderly conduct.)
Second, in the case where the prosecutor offers to
amend the sole, underlying charge to a count of disorderly
conduct to induce a plea, the innocent defendant could reject
that offer, go to trial, and face only one count (e.g., battery)
instead of two counts (e.g., battery plus the disorderly
conduct tack-on).
The innocent defendant in this position would be less
likely to capitulate to a plea bargain, as there would be less
to lose (i.e., he or she would face fewer counts and a lower
potential penalty) when going to trial. Perhaps even more
significantly, at trial the jury would be prevented from
splitting the charges in a convenient compromise verdict—in
my experience, typically “not guilty” of the underlying charge
but “guilty” of disorderly conduct—as there would be only a
single count for it to consider.184
In sum, the statutory amendment proposed above
would curtail the prosecutorial practice of extorting a plea to
one count in exchange for dismissal of the other—at least in
the context of the disorderly-conduct charge-stacking ploy.
In this narrow context, no longer would the prosecutor be
able to so easily obtain a criminal conviction—possibly from
an innocent defendant, no less—without proving the state’s
case at trial.

See id. at 1125-26 (discussing how the jurors may “horse-trade”
charges to reach a “compromise verdict”); see also Andrew D. Leipold &
Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (2006)
(“[T]he more counts in the indictment, the quicker the jury may be to
assume that the accused must be guilty of something.”).
184
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Broad, sweeping claims of police racism are popular
in academia and other circles. However, such claims pose
three potential problems. First, concerning the statistics
cited, a claimant might be confusing correlation with
causation.185 Second, policing is a very state-, county-, and
even agency-specific matter. Just as police misconduct in
Minneapolis, for example, tells us nothing about police
practices in, say, New York or Seattle, these broad claims of
police racism are often meaningless. 186 And third, worse
than being meaningless, broad claims of racism may even
detract from the true, underlying problem.187
This article investigated a particular claim of police racism:
that the police are using disorderly conduct statutes to
surveil African American neighborhoods “for signs of
disorder” and “as a means of social control against people of
color.” 188 This article examined a sample of disorderly
conduct cases from a state, county, and timeframe that
would likely substantiate this race-motivated theory if the
theory is true.189
The investigation found that African Americans were indeed
charged with disorderly conduct at a disproportionately high
rate relative to their percentage of the population. 190
However, this by itself does not mean that the charging
difference is due to race-based police surveillance.191 Rather,
a deeper investigation into the facts revealed that in all cases
filed against African American defendants, the police were
not surveilling anyone for any reason.192
Instead, in all cases, the police were summoned to the
scene by a citizen or complaining witness who alleged that
the defendant had committed a crime—usually an allegation
of domestic violence. 193 Consequently, at least concerning
the venue and jurisdiction under investigation, this article’s
See Part III.C.
See Part V.
187 See id.
188 See Part II.D.
189 See Part III.B.
190 See Part III.C.
191 See id.
192 See Part IV.A.
193 See id.
185
186
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findings do not support, but rather directly contradict, the
broad-brush claim of racist police surveillance.194
This article also investigated and confirmed a second,
independent hypothesis: that the disorderly conduct is being
abused not by racist police, but in a race-neutral way by
prosecutors. 195 In the vast majority of cases, disorderly
conduct was merely tacked on to a primary, underlying
charge (usually battery) that was part of the same alleged
incident. 196 This practice of charge-stacking gives the
prosecutor a tremendous advantage over the defendant in
plea bargaining; unsurprisingly, not a single case in the
sample of cases went to trial.197
Given that racist police surveillance was ruled out as
an explanation for the disproportionate charging of African
Americans with disorderly conduct, and given that the
prosecutorial practice of charge-stacking was substantiated,
this article concludes by recommending reform that is
tailored to the real problem.198 By amending the statute to
prohibit the use of disorderly conduct as a duplicative addon charge, the coercive prosecutorial tactic of chargestacking will be curtailed and the disorderly conduct law will
be limited to its proper and intended uses.199

See id.
See Part III.A.
196 See Part IV.B.
197 See id.
198 See Part VI.
199 See id.
194
195
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APPENDIX: DATABASE OF CASES

The table of cases is sorted by three criteria in the
following order: (1) the defendant’s race; (2) whether the case
is charged as domestic abuse (violence); and (3) the
description of the criminal charges. The following shorthand
is used for criminal charges. Other shorthand is also listed
below:
CCW = Carrying a Concealed Weapon
CDTP = Criminal Damage to Property
DC = Disorderly Conduct
FI = False Imprisonment
Intimid = Intimidation of a Victim
OAR = Operating After Revocation
Para Poss’n = Drug Paraphernalia Possession
RES = Reckless Endangerment of Safety
AfAm = African American
Cauc = Caucasian
Dis = Dismissed
DV = Domestic Violence (also known as Domestic
Abuse)
Hisp = Hispanic
Two case numbers in the table of cases have been
excluded to comply with the most expansive imaginable
reading of the rule of confidentiality.200 Some cases in the
table may have subsequently been expunged by the court
and may no longer be publicly available.201
Some criminal charges, such as Battery, can be either
a misdemeanor or felony depending on the severity of the
alleged injury and other factors.202 Domestic-related charges,
including Battery and Disorderly Conduct, can be
misdemeanors or felonies depending on whether the
defendant has prior domestic abuse convictions.203
Any charge of any classification (domestic or nondomestic) and severity (felony or misdemeanor) can be

See supra note 47.
See WIS. STAT. § 973.015.
202 See WIS. STAT. § 940.19 – 940.208.
203 See supra note 44.
200
201
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enhanced if the defendant is a general repeater 204 or is
subjected to other penalty enhancers, such as the dangerous
weapon enhancer.205
These charge classifications and penalty distinctions,
however, are not relevant for this article and therefore are
not included in the table of cases. Similarly, bail jumping
charges are ignored.
No.

Case No.

Def's
Sex

Def's
Race

Description of
Charges

DV

Resolution

Battery (5),
CDTP, FI,
Strangulation
(2), DC (4)
Battery, CDTP,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

Plea
to
D.C.
N

DV

Plea Deal

Y

1

-------

M

AfAm

2

18cm1078

M

AfAm

3

18cm1086

M

AfAm

Battery, CDTP,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

4

18cf799

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

5

18cm843

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

6

18cm879

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

7

18cm946

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

8

18cm999

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

9

18cf778

M

AfAm

DV

Plea Deal

N

10

18cf744

M

AfAm

DV

Plea Deal

Y

11

18cf867

M

AfAm

Battery, FI,
Kidnapping,
DC
Battery,
Intimid, OAR,
Resisting, DC
Battery,
Intimid,
Strangulation,
DC

DV

Dis

--

204
205

See WIS. STAT. § 939.62.
See WIS. STAT. § 939.63.
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12

18cm844

F

AfAm

Battery,
Oleoresin
Device, DC
Battery, Violate
No Contact, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

13

18cf750

M

AfAm

DV

Plea Deal

Y

14

18cm902

M

AfAm

DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

15

18cm936

M

AfAm

DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

16

18cm960

M

AfAm

DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

17

18cm986

M

AfAm

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

N

18

18cm1029

F

AfAm

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

Y

19

18cm842

M

AfAm

CDTP, Drug
Poss'n, DC

Plea Deal

N

20

18cm971

M

AfAm

DC

Plea Deal

Y

21

18cm939

M

AfAm

Obstructing,
DC

Plea Deal

Y

22

18cf1023

F

AfAm

Plea Deal

Y

23

18cm937

M

AfAm

Obstructing,
Fleeing Officer,
DC
Resisting, DC

Plea Deal

N

24

18cm856

M

Asian

Battery, DC

DV

Dis

--

25

18cf771

M

Cauc

DV

Plea Deal

Y

26

18cf725

F

Cauc

DV

Plea Deal

Y

27

18cm850

M

Cauc

Battery (2),
Burglary,
CDTP,
Strangulation,
DC
Battery (2),
Child Neglect,
FI, DC
Battery (2), DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

28

18cm897

M

Cauc

Battery (2),
Sexual Assault
(2), DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y
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29

18cf797

M

Cauc

DV

Plea Deal

Y

Cauc

Battery, CDTP,
Strangulation,
DC
Battery, DC

30

18cm892

M

DV

Dis

--

31

18cm853

F

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

32

18cm894

F

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

33

18cm973

F

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

34

18cm980

F

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

35

18cf793-b

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

36

18cf810

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

37

18cm841

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

38

18cm849

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

39

18cm945

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

40

18cm952

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

41

18cm992

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

42

18cf821-b

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

DV

Dis

--

43

18cf793-a

M

Cauc

Battery, FI, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

44

18cf745

M

Cauc

DV

Dis

--

45

18cf748

M

Cauc

Battery, FI,
Intimid,
Strangulation,
DC
Battery, FI,
Intimid,
Strangulation,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

N
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46

18cf749

M

Cauc

Battery, FI,
Strangulation,
Theft, DC
Battery,
Intimid, DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

47

18cm846

M

Cauc

DV

Dis

--

48

18cf812

M

Cauc

Battery,
Intimid, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

49

18cf708

M

Cauc

Battery, RES,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

50

18cf714

M

Cauc

DV

Plea Deal

Y

51

18cm864

F

Cauc

Battery,
Strangulation,
DC
CDTP, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

52

18cm951

M

Cauc

CDTP, Intimid,
DC

DV

Dis

--

53

18cf760

M

Cauc

Child Abuse,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

54

18cm948

M

Cauc

DC

DV

Dis

--

55

18cm881

M

Cauc

DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

56

18cm905

M

Cauc

DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

57

18cm938

M

Cauc

DC (2)

DV

Plea Deal

Y

58

18cf757

M

Cauc

Drug Poss'n,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

N

59

18cm950

M

Cauc

Para Poss'n,
DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

60

18cm1008

M

Cauc

Resisting, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

61

18cf821-a

M

Cauc

Strangulation,
DC

DV

Dis

--

62

18cm909

M

Cauc

Theft, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

63

18cm908

M

Cauc

Violate No
Contact, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y
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18cf768

M

Cauc

Arson,
Obstructing,
DC
Battery, Child
Abuse, DC

Plea Deal

N

65

18cf772

M

Cauc

Plea Deal

N

66

18cm1040

F

Cauc

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

Y

67

18cf1013

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

Y

68

18cm961

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

Y

69

18cm1289

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

Y

70

18cm1463

M

Cauc

Battery, DC

Plea Deal

N

71

18cm979

M

Cauc

CCW, DC

Plea Deal

Y

72

18cm1146

M

Cauc

CDTP, DC

Dis

--

73

18cm974

F

Cauc

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

N

74

-------

M

Cauc

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

Y

75

18cm969-a

M

Cauc

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

Y

76

18cm1119

M

Cauc

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

Y

77

18cf826

M

Cauc

Child Abuse
(2), RES, DC

Dis

--

78

18cf739

M

Cauc

Child Abuse,
DC

Plea Deal

Y

79

18cm1172

M

Cauc

DC

Dis

--

80

18cm900

M

Cauc

DC

Plea Deal

Y

81

18cm947

M

Cauc

DC

Plea Deal

Y
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82

18cm969-b

M

Cauc

DC

Plea Deal

Y

83

18cm969-c

M

Cauc

DC

Plea Deal

N

84

18cm878

M

Cauc

DC

NGI

--

85

18cm868

M

Cauc

DC (2)

Plea Deal

Y

86

18cm1437

M

Cauc

Resisting, DC

Dis

--

87

18cf758

M

Cauc

Plea Deal

N

88

18cf734

M

Hisp

Resisting,
Threat to LEO,
DC
Battery, DC

DV

Dis

--

89

18cm910

M

Hisp

Battery, DC

DV

Plea Deal

Y

90

18cm959

F

Hisp

DC

DV

Dis

--

91

18cm901

M

Hisp

CDTP, DC

Plea Deal

N

